Bill Clinton was heavily criticised for failing to produce a positive foreign policy legacy, especially on relations with Russia. Analyse this view in terms of the extent to which three key factors – the president, his advisors and the actions of Moscow itself – shaped the direction of US policy in this area.

This is a research paper written in May 2011 for my unit on the American Presidency at the University of Bristol.

The relationship between the United States and Russia – both in the modern context and during the Soviet era – is a pivotal force in contemporary geopolitics. In the 45 years after World War Two, bitter conflict between the opposing ideological worldviews of the capitalist USA and the communist Soviet Union “defined the central drama within the international system” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 1). Although the sheer acrimony of the Cold War can be difficult to comprehend for those born when the conflict was drawing to a close, its legacy is ubiquitous in today’s geopolitical arena – particularly in shaping the issues and tensions which characterise relations between two former arch enemies.

This paper examines the dynamics of power and decision-making in executive administrative structures through the lens of Russia policy under President Bill Clinton, weighing up three key factors – the president’s personal conduct (views and relationships), opinions of advisors, and the actions of Russia itself – in attempting to analyse which played the most important part in dictating policy. This debate is contextualised within a broader examination of Clinton’s legacy on relations with Russia.

Much study has been devoted to how presidents act in making policy decisions. Obviously, the factors described above are closely interlinked; none can be excluded from any policy-making process. Moreover, the “brevity and lack of clarity” (Pika & Maltese 2010: 3) in Article II of the US Constitution, which deals with the executive branch, has encouraged presidents to formulate varying interpretations of their own political power as they serve the interests of the American people.

This problematic practice manifests itself on multiple levels, particularly through institutional tension between the executive and legislative branches. However, as the president has traditionally been “the most important single factor in the determination of American foreign policy” (Corwin 1957: 179), this study will look at executive decision-making structures and the personalities behind them, while also attempting to distinguish US actions as proactive or reactive. In other words, have presidents themselves taken the initiative in relations with Russia, or rather been forced to respond to the Kremlin’s geopolitical gambits?

The End of History?

When the Soviet Union ceased to exist in late 1991, it came as a surprise “to scholars as much as to the mass public” (White 2001: 73). In 1989, as the Cold War was winding down, Francis Fukuyama spoke about a potential “end of history” – that is, “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (Fukuyama 1989: 1). This seminal phrase came to typify the ideological grandstanding which accompanied the USSR’s unexpected collapse: despite Western experts widely failing to predict the historic event, they rushed to proclaim a definitive victory over communism.

In terms of broader policy-making, the fact that the US was no longer “bound in a suicide pact” (Talbott 2002: 372) with the USSR meant there was “no obvious frame or reference for ordering the world” (Lebow 1995: 239). The sudden lack of this powerful enemy, famously condemned as the “evil empire” by President Ronald Reagan (1983), meant US administrations could no longer promote or formulate their foreign agendas in these stark confrontational terms. Debates became increasingly “devoid of ideological packaging” (Lebow 1995: 244) and attention turned to “transforming Russia into a market economy, a democratic polity, and a new partner with the West” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 1).

Such was the diplomatic atmosphere when Bill Clinton took office in 1993. As “the first truly post-Cold War president” (Goldman & Berman 2000: 229), the intellectual challenge of forming a cohesive foreign policy doctrine to guide America in this new era was an imposing task. Many critics judged Clinton to have failed in this goal by the end of his second term, citing a “lack of a coherent, long-term strategy or vision” (Naim 1997: 34). However, while this may be a fair assessment of his general legacy, Clinton’s policy towards Russia was arguably characterised by a far more consistent line of thinking.

From the beginning of his administration, Clinton held out the hand of friendship to Russia, taking a proactive stance in developing the country’s nascent democracy. He realised this meant lending as much support as possible to his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin (Mendelson 2002), a mercurial politician who presented himself as a devout liberal reformer. Clinton assembled a strong staff of dedicated experts, employing a collegial system of decision-making which emphasised “group problem-solving, teamwork and shared responsibility for outcomes” (Pika & Maltese 2010: 168). However, although the president’s Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, had been given the Russia brief, it was Clinton – in the words of Talbott himself – who acted as “the US government’s principle Russia hand… for the duration of his presidency” (2002: 5).

Clinton’s tendency to take the lead was a defining factor as his government faced a plethora of challenges in bilateral relations: NATO expansion, the multifaceted Balkan conflict, Iran’s nuclear programme, arms control and Russia’s fragile economic and political liberalisation. The next section examines how Clinton’s administration tackled these complex problems, focusing on leadership style and the key role of personal ties between the US president and Boris Yeltsin.

Economics First

As the figurehead of liberal reform in the turbulent political environment of post-Soviet Russia, President Yeltsin was often the focus of Clinton’s policy initiatives. This became clear from the two leaders’ first meeting: in April 1993 at a summit in Vancouver, Clinton announced a $2.5 billion aid package for Russia and other newly independent states, with Moscow to receive the lion’s share of $1.6 billion (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 92). Clinton also lobbied for even larger multilateral aid through the G7, nearly doubling the sum previously agreed by George Bush and his partners to a total of $43 billion, while setting only vague conditions for implementation (ibid).

Strobe Talbott writes of the president’s constant demand for his staff to ‘think bigger’: “Every time we mentioned an area for possible assistance – humanitarian relief, energy, housing, agriculture, stabilisation of the currency – he asked why we couldn’t do more” (2002: 52). Clinton, however, delegated the detail to his aides, and it was Treasury official (later Secretary) Lawrence Summers who represented “the intellectual and bureaucratic driving force behind the economic component of our policy toward the former Soviet Union” (ibid: 48). This observation potently illustrates a well-known trend: constant time constraints mean presidential statements of intent are frequently left in the hands of advisors, who translate big ideas into concrete policy proposals.

While this may seem an obvious deduction, Clinton’s unflinching enthusiasm for helping Russia was not always reflected across the executive branch. Throughout the early 1990s, Yeltsin confronted serious political challenges and even crisis situations – most significantly the brief civil war in October 1993. Despite the Russian president’s use of force to suppress an attempted coup, the US administration remained supportive1. Clinton believed Russia’s democratic future was inexorably tied to Yeltsin’s survival, and the administration followed his guidance in spite of a growing view among aides that Yeltsin was “a flawed and limited regime transformer” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 119).

The 1998 Russian economic meltdown changed this mentality, with severe consequences for bilateral relations and aid programmes – it was perceived by the US as “the end of a chapter” (Horelick & Graham 2000: 7). Amidst political uncertainly, Russia’s economy appeared to be in “suspended animation, caught between the polar extremes of a reversal to a command recovery and the restoration of reform” (Henry & Nixon 1998: 22). The White House pushed aggressively for a bailout instigated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), overruling the “voice of caution” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 223) espoused by Treasury officials. Fears about a nuclear state’s financial fall played heavily: Clinton’s security advisors “trumped the economics team on the bailout debate” (ibid: 227). On July 13 the IMF announced a $22.6 billion emergency funding package, stipulating a string of reforms which the Russian government agreed to enact (ibid: 228).

A series of subsequent policy miscalculations in Moscow, taken against American advice, led to the crash. Russian legislators introduced a package of emergency measures which “the Clinton administration and IMF officials did not support” (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003: 231). The resulting crisis triggered a dramatic shift in US-Russia relations: criticism of Clinton was manifold, and even the president himself privately “hinted that Russia might be lost” (ibid: 241). Coupled with the dual blow of the Lewinsky sex scandal, which erupted at exactly the same time, the August events “permanently altered the way in which Clinton engaged on Russia issues for the rest of his term” (ibid: 246).

Furthermore, as the economic pillar of Clinton’s proactive policy collapsed, disenchantment purged the presidential team of its enthusiasm: they no longer had the energy or conviction to defend their Russian counterparts (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 243). The president’s bold support of the cause had been let down by failures in Moscow, and, with little interest in sending major new IMF funds to Russia, he was forced to adopt a ‘tough love’ message which was “very un-Clinton” (ibid). This represented a key change of direction – rather than overcoming cabinet doubts with his own proactive attitude, as he had done previously, Clinton had to accept the general consensus and tone down his supportive rhetoric while financial aid was reduced accordingly.

The Bigger Picture

Outside the economic sphere, it can be argued that Clinton was frequently successful in terms of direct policy results, most notably during the first five years of his administration. Three important post-Cold War defence issues – involving India, Ukraine and the Baltic states – were resolved with Russian co-operation over 1993-94; the two sides managed to find agreement on the problem of intervention in Bosnia in 1995; and the crucial, complex question of NATO enlargement was tactfully played out over several years before becoming reality in 1997. High-level Clinton-Yeltsin meetings often produced decisive outcomes, but other diplomatic channels also played a central role: Talbott formed a close working relationship with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov, and a special commission established in 1993 enabled US Vice President Al Gore to hold a series of productive biannual gatherings with Yeltsin’s Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin.

Russia’s desire to fulfil a $140-million Soviet-era contract for the sale of cryogenic rocket technology to India was one of Talbott’s first challenges. The deal, which violated international non-proliferation guidelines, would have “fanned the arms race between India and Pakistan, triggered American sanctions against Russia and prevented US-Russian co-operation in space” (Talbott 2002: 81). After initial difficulties – including resistance from Yeltsin himself – Talbott and Mamedov formulated a draft agreement, sealed in Washington in July 1993. Russia agreed to conform to a G7 protocol known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR) by cancelling its sale, thus nullifying the threat of sanctions, and in return the US pledged to spend $400 million on Russian space equipment (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 165). For Talbott (2002: 83), it was an outcome that “augured well for progress on non-proliferation more generally, including with respect to Iran” – another critical concern on the global nuclear security agenda.

Following the USSR’s collapse, around 170 intercontinental ballistic missiles were left on the territory of newly-independent Ukraine, a country many feared was “spiralling into chaos” in spring 1993 (Talbott 2002: 79). According to Talbott, “Moscow wanted Ukraine to send the warheads to Russia immediately and unconditionally, while nationalists in Ukraine wanted to keep them as a deterrent against Russian intimidation or aggression” (ibid). This ominous deadlock was described by Clinton’s Deputy Secretary of Defence as “the single biggest threat to international peace we faced anywhere in the world” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 166). American officials eventually mediated an agreement in which the US would “pay for a transfer of Russian fuel rods to Ukraine in exchange for the withdrawal of the strategic nuclear warheads” (ibid: 169), signed in January 1994 along with a series of other beneficial security guarantees.

President Clinton played a vital role in the withdrawal of Russian military forces controversially stationed on former Soviet territory in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Finding agreement on this issue carried wide policy implications – it threatened “to unravel the efforts to assist Russia’s economic and political transition” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 171), especially as a stubborn Congress was ready to amend aid legislation and “cut off all American credits to Russia” unless Moscow complied with its pullout timetable (Stanley 1994). Clinton brokered a deal in which the US committed $160 million to build more than 5,000 housing units for returning Russian soldiers (Sciolino 1993), and in July 1994 pressured Yeltsin into agreeing that his troops would leave Estonia if “Russian military pensioners were allowed to stay” (Talbott 2002: 129). In skilfully mediating this delicate dispute, Clinton highlighted the importance of good relations at the highest diplomatic level as “a means of getting his man in Moscow to resolve thorny issues” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 175) when the two leaders met in person.

The priority issue of NATO membership for ex-communist nations divided opinion in the Clinton administration. While the State department was eager to admit new countries as soon as possible, the Pentagon and military held the opposite view (Talbott 2002: 97-8). Talbott, always mindful of Russia’s domestic situation, knew that “no US policy infuriated Boris Yeltsin more” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 182) because extending NATO had the potential to unleash a political storm in Moscow. Nationalist and communist leaders believed a bigger NATO represented a major security threat and wanted to keep the West away from former Soviet and communist states in Russia’s near abroad. Talbott’s cautiously positive compromise won cabinet support: after integrating Russia with Europe through a widely inclusive Partnership for Peace (PFP), NATO enlargement would be the next step in an “evolutionary process” (Talbott 2002: 100). This policy of “PFP today, enlargement tomorrow” (ibid: 101) also received the support of a relieved President Yeltsin in October 1993.

In the following years, Clinton’s team tactfully navigated stormy geopolitical waters over the enlargement question, culminating with a formal NATO-Russia partnership signed in May 1997. At a Helsinki summit in March that year, Clinton personally negotiated the final terms with Yeltsin – whose re-election in 1996 had secured his position. The Russian president’s request for a secret agreement that NATO would not embrace former Soviet republics was flatly denied; Clinton explained the numerous problems such a deal would create for both sides and the need to emphasise “an integrated, undivided Europe” (Talbott 2002: 239) free of Cold War animosity. He also “made clear to his team that it needed to respond to Russian requests for membership in key clubs to ease the pain” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 206). The most important of these was the G7, which, on admitting Russia to become the G8 in 1998, represented “a long-sought, hard-won trophy” (Talbott 2002: 317) for Yeltsin with huge symbolic significance.

The Russian liberal politician Yegor Gaidar, Yeltsin’s one-time prime minister, later spoke of how Clinton had managed to “pull off the seemingly impossible: to implement NATO enlargement without causing irreparable damage to either democratic elements in Russia’s political establishment or to US-Russian relations” (quoted in Stent 1999: 227). This is not a hyperbolic analysis. Again, Clinton’s diplomatic finesse and close bond with Yeltsin were essential tools – the two leaders applauded their ability to find consensus where their advisors could not.

In 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords and a US-brokered Russian agreement with NATO on intervention in Bosnia had given momentum to positive resolution of the enlargement issue. Clinton and Yeltsin charged their defence ministers with creating a NATO-Russia force in Bosnia which preserved US unity of command but did not subordinate Moscow to the alliance. The settlement was that Russia “agreed to serve under an American general but not in the NATO chain of command” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 200). Furthermore, a compromise was also reached on upholding the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which “codified the end of the Cold War in military terms” (ibid: 198) by imposing restrictions on military deployment in different regions of Europe.

Talbott extols the vital importance of “an effective channel between the Pentagon and the Russian Ministry of Defence” at a time when traditional civilian diplomacy stalled over solutions to these complex issues (2002: 186). In particular, US Secretary of Defence William Perry was instrumental in “cutting against the grain of conventional thinking in the administration” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 199) by advocating a plan for Bosnia with full Russian inclusion. Although Clinton and Yeltsin had settled the underlying questions, the input of seasoned military experts was decisive.

This admirable string of successes catalysed a sense of progressive optimism that the US-Russia bilateral relationship had truly turned a corner. The strong presidential bond and Clinton’s policy of “offering Russia financial inducements, memberships in international clubs, and status as an important global power” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 181) seemed to be working. His support had also helped the Russian president overcome instability in Moscow, nourishing hopes that the roots of democracy were really taking hold.

War and Woe

The August 1998 financial crisis was not the only event which contributed to shattering the optimism of Clinton’s Russia team and its perceived failure to produce a positive legacy. Although the Bosnia issue had been resolved in 1995, the spectre of Balkan conflict returned in 1998 when the Yugoslav leader, President Slobodan Milosevic, initiated an ethnic onslaught against Albanians in Kosovo, thereby triggering “the most severe, dangerous and consequential crisis in US-Russia relations of the post-Cold War period” (Talbott 2002: 297) – and ultimately bringing America “the closest to exchanging blows with the Russians since the Kennedy administration in the Cuban missile crisis four decades earlier” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 248).

Once again, Russia and America were essentially in opposing corners – the Russians emotionally siding with Milosevic in pan-Slavic unity, the US rallying Western allies against genocide and pushing for NATO intervention. Clinton attached special importance to keeping Russia active in negotiations with the Serb leader, but not only to leverage increased pressure on Belgrade; he wanted to banish Cold War ghosts by showing that “its principal combatants were now on the same side against new threats to international peace” (Talbott 2002: 299). The US president also did not want a repeat of the dithering four years it had taken to intervene decisively in Bosnia.

In March 1999, after the Serbs refused to comply with UN resolutions, NATO began its bombing campaign – prompting Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov2 to famously abandon a meeting with Vice President Gore by turning his plane around and returning home. This symbolic gesture highlighted “the significant souring in the American-Russian relationship” (Broder 1999). Primakov’s stance reflected widespread disdain across Russia: military action was seen as an American power grab, with subsequent polls showing 90 percent of people believed the NATO strikes were a mistake (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 252-3).

The US administration expected a short war – “the hope was that just a few bombs would push Milosevic back to the bargaining table” (Harden 1999). Any peace deal with Belgrade hinged on Russia agreeing to the deployment of NATO troops in Kosovo. Yeltsin, who feared a solution that did not involve Russia would hurt the country’s prestige, appointed Chernomyrdin as his envoy.

For the bombardment to stop, conditions were clear: all Serb forces had to quit Kosovo and allow refugees to return under the protection of a force “with NATO at its core” (Harden 1999). Russia heavily resisted the idea of total withdrawal, but several rounds of gruelling negotiations produced a proposal that Milosevic accepted early in June 1999 – after more than a month of relentless NATO air attacks. Talbott (2002: 328) believed that “Chernomyrdin’s endorsement of the conditions was a crucial factor in Milosevic’s decision to throw in the towel,” as the Serb leader had relied on Moscow to shield him from Western wrath.

Several days elapsed before bombing ceased, and questions remained about how the joint NATO-Russia force could operate3. As negotiations proceeded, alarming signs emerged that Russian army leaders were “flouting the principle of civilian control of the military” (Talbott 2002: 326). Chaos erupted when 200 Russian soldiers marched into Kosovo through Serbia, entering a standoff with British units at Pristina airport. Yeltsin’s foreign minister told Talbott the operation had been a mistake and promised swift withdrawal (ibid: 343), but the apparent act of mutiny had given US diplomats “good reason to believe that the Russian military was out of control” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 263).

It fell yet again to Clinton and Yeltsin to reach closure, after the latter “had been out of sight and out of contact during the crisis” (Talbott 2002: 346). On June 14, he told Clinton that Russia would accept NATO terms for a joint operation and their defence ministers would “work out the details” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 264). Most significantly, Yeltsin was desperate to end the dispute before a G8 summit on June 18-20: this was a valuable opportunity for him to “appear as one of the world’s top leaders” (ibid: 260), which Talbott (2002: 348) had counted on as the US “trump card” in negotiations.

The Kosovo affair acutely demonstrated a divisive quandary for Russia’s leaders, “squeezed between a domestic political need to appear to be defending the interest of the Serbs, and a compelling economic need to secure more financial help from the West” (Harden 1999). Yeltsin was “torn between co-operating with the West and fulminating against the nature of that co-operation and Russia’s inferior position” (Shevtsova 2007: 4). Moreover, the country’s armed forces were suffering from a post-Soviet inferiority complex4 that very nearly killed any chance for NATO-Russia collaboration in the peacekeeping mission that followed (Talbott 2002: 348).

It took 72 days of bombing and many sessions of talks on several diplomatic and military levels to finally reach agreement. Clinton’s pet policy of integrating Russia into elite Western institutions really paid off: for Yeltsin, economic necessity had outweighed age-old Slavic solidarity. However, although the complex Kosovo problem was indeed resolved, bilateral relations were deeply damaged. In Moscow, the saga became “a substantiation of all the Russians’ reasons for fearing NATO and opposing its expansion” (Talbott 2002: 301); on the other side, there was “real suspicion in Washington about whether Russian leaders shared the values espoused by the Western community” (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 265).

Furthermore, in late 1999 another shock came when Russia renewed its brutal war in the rebellious republic of Chechnya – leading to “vehement disputes over the conduct of Moscow’s military campaign” (Horelick & Graham 2000: 7) and its simultaneous crackdown on press freedom. This negative dynamic was exasperated by the fact that Clinton had effectively turned a blind eye to the first Chechen war, and a view in Moscow that US criticism was hypocritical coming from a country that used similar tactics against Serbia during the Kosovo conflict (ibid). Clinton’s team, already drained of enthusiasm after the economic crash and Kosovo, had little energy for the issue, and the president’s “leverage for changing Russian behaviour” was equally diminished (Goldgeier & McFaul 2003: 275).


Although widely regarded as a president who focused on domestic issues, Bill Clinton held a high personal stake in shaping the key tenets of US policy on Russia. He achieved significant success as a direct result of the proactive, pro-engagement mentality instilled in his administration from day one. Nevertheless, analysts persistently criticise Clinton’s lack of a visionary doctrine to fill the adversarial vacuum left by the Cold War’s end, often accusing his team of an idealistic, scattergun approach to Russia policy. Unresolved questions also remained: by the end of his second term, after an undeniable slump in relations, Clinton had neither the time nor political capital with Moscow to tackle nuclear disarmament or Russian weapons sales to Iran, which had been going on covertly since 1995 despite a cessation agreement5.

Furthermore, many critics argue that Clinton got too close for comfort with President Yeltsin, and that this “distorted the administration’s perception of the real situation in Russia” (Horelick & Graham 2000: 14). Allegations of double standards emerged when dubious Russian actions produced a pronounced policy ambivalence, or even wilful ignorance, regarding the Chechnya wars and Yeltsin’s political tactics – denounced by some as the creation of an “electoral monarchy” (Shevtsova 2007: 6) with unprecedented executive power.

Strobe Talbott, who was often shocked when his boss laughed off Yeltsin’s inappropriate misbehaviour, provides revealing insight into the presidential relationship. He believes their almost fraternal affinity derived from the idea that Clinton saw Yeltsin as a personification of Russia itself: “The country, like Yeltsin was a bit of a mess. Its behaviour, like his, was erratic… Counting to ten when Yeltsin embarrassed himself was part of staying on message with our Russia policy” (Talbott 2002: 185). This was the foundation of Clinton’s steadfast support.

The realist standpoint espoused by George W. Bush brought a huge contrast: Russia lost its special place on the policy priority list6. Relations improved as a result of the 9/11 attacks and Bush’s War on Terror, but collapsed once again in August 2005 after Russia’s five-day conflict with Georgia. President Barack Obama, who consequently faced “the most daunting challenge thus far” (Graham 2010: 50), is pursuing a proactive ‘reset’ policy designed to rebuild positive ties with Moscow and has already sealed a nuclear arms reduction treaty7.

Long-term effects of Obama’s detente remain to be seen, but the intervening years since Clinton left office in 2000 have demonstrated that strong engagement is essential for both countries. Clinton and his aides may have been “intellectually, politically, institutionally, and economically unprepared” for dealing with the mammoth challenge of building a democratic post-communist Russia (Horelick & Graham 2000: 5), but, if the broad (and somewhat abstract) doctrinal concern is cast aside, their standalone policy record is impressive. Looking at the bigger picture, it is also important to note that Russia was sometimes just a secondary consideration – working with Moscow was a necessary step to implement flagship projects. Foreign policy is by nature a game of balancing different interests, so as Clinton’s team set out goals regarding NATO enlargement and intervention in Kosovo, US-Russia co-operation was seen as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.

Finally, a contextual awareness of Russia is especially crucial to this argument. In the heat of the Kosovo conflict, one renowned analyst bluntly declared that “even a half-dead, stone-cold-drunk Boris Yeltsin is still an enormous asset for the US” (Friedman 1999), simply because there was no alternative. Yeltsin’s fiery nationalist and communist opponents in Moscow wanted to turn back the clock and finish reform forever. Just as it is fair to conclude that “any president at this historical juncture would likely have [had] difficulty defining a vision” for US foreign policy (Goldman & Berman 2000: 227), the chances are that any president would also have backed Yeltsin to the end despite his flaws.


Broder, J.M. 2000. ‘Despite a Secret Pact by Gore in ’95, Russian Arms Sales to Iran Go On’. The New York Times, October 13. [link]

Broder, J.M. 1999. ‘A Phone Call From Gore and a U-Turn to Moscow’. The New York Times, March 24. [link]

Campbell, C. and Rockman, B.A. (eds.). 2000. The Clinton Legacy. New York / London: Chatham House Publishers.

Charap, S. 2010. ‘Assessing the “Reset” and the Next Steps for US Russia Policy’. Washington, DC: Centre for American Progress. [link]

Colton, T., Frye, T. and Legvold, R (eds.). 2010. The Policy World Meets Academia: Designing U.S. Policy Toward Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts: American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Corwin, E.S. 1957. The President: Office and Powers (fourth edition). New York: New York University Press.

Friedman, T.L. 1999. ‘Foreign Affairs; Our Buddy Boris’. The New York Times, April 16. [link]

Fukuyama, F. 1989. ‘The End of History?’ The National Interest, Summer 1989. [link]

Goldgeier, J.M. and McFaul, M. 2003. Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Goldman, E.O. and Berman, L. 2000. ‘Engaging the World: First Impressions of the Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy’. In: Campbell and Rockman (eds.), The Clinton Legacy, pp. 226-253.

Graham, T. 2010. ‘Assessing the Russian Challenge to U.S. Policy’. In: Colton, Frye and Legvold (eds.), The Policy World Meets Academia: Designing U.S. Policy Toward Russia, pp. 50-57.

Harden, B. 1999. ‘Special Report: A Long Struggle That Led Serb Leader to Back Down’. The New York Times, June 6. [link]

Henry, B. and Nixon, J. 1998. ‘The Crisis in Russia: Some Initial Observations’. Economic Outlook, Vol. 23 (1), pp. 22-29. [link]

Horelick, A. and Graham, T. 2000. US-Russian Relations at the Turn of the Century. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. [link]

Lebow, R.N. 1995. ‘Psychological Dimensions of Post-Cold War Foreign Policy’. In: Renshon, S.A. (ed.), The Clinton Presidency: Campaigning, Governing, and the Psychology of Leadership, pp. 235-245.

Mendelson, S.E. 2002. ‘The View From Above: An Insider’s Take on Clinton’s Russia Policy’. Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002. [link]

McManus, D. and Lauter, D. 1993. ‘Reaffirming Support, Clinton Says Yeltsin Had to Use Force’. Los Angeles Times, October 5. [link]

Naim, M. 1997. ‘Clinton’s Foreign Policy: A Victim of Globalisation?’ Foreign Policy 109, Winter 1997-98, pp. 34-45. [link]

Pika, J.A. and Maltese, J.A. 2010. The Politics of the Presidency (revised seventh edition). Washington, DC: CQ Press / SAGE.

Reagan, R. 1983. ‘Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida’ on March 8, 1983. Washington, DC: National Centre for Public Policy Research. [link]

Renshon, S.A. (ed.). 1995. The Clinton Presidency: Campaigning, Governing, and the Psychology of Leadership. Boulder, USA: Westview.

Schmemann, S. 1993. ‘Russia’s Military: A Shrivelled and Volatile Legacy. The New York Times, November 28. [link]

Sciolino, E. 1993. ‘Christopher, in Latvia, Presses for Russian Pullout’. The New York Times, October 28. [link]

Shevtsova, L. 2007. Russia – Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Spanger, H-J. 2008. ‘Power Without Purpose – George W. Bush’s Failed Policy towards Russia’. International Politics and Society, 2008 (2), pp. 50-69. [link]

Stanley, A. 1994. ‘Russia Agrees to Full Withdrawal of Troops in Estonia by Aug. 31’. The New York Times, July 27. [link]

Stent, A. 1999. Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Talbott, S. 2002. The Russia Hand – A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy. New York: Random House.

White, S. 2001. Communism and its Collapse. London: Routledge.

  1. See McManus & Lauter, 1993, ‘Reaffirming Support, Clinton Says Yeltsin Had to Use Force’. []
  2. Primakov took office in September 1998; Chernomyrdin, whose frequent meetings with Gore had produced real diplomatic progress, had been fired in March 1998. []
  3. The US wanted to work under the Bosnia model; Russia wanted its own sector in northern Kosovo. []
  4. See Schmemann, 1993, ‘Russia’s Military: A Shrivelled and Volatile Legacy’. []
  5. See Broder, 2000, ‘Despite a Secret Pact by Gore in ’95, Russian Arms Sales to Iran Go On’. []
  6. See Spanger, 2008, ‘Power without Purpose – George W. Bush’s Failed Policy towards Russia’. []
  7. See Charap, 2010, ‘Assessing the “Reset” and the Next Steps for U.S. Russia Policy’. []